Savak
23rd August 2008, 17:11
MILITARY coups are rarities these days, so there was something rather
nostalgic about the events in Pakistan on October 12th. Televisions went
black, then martial music started up against a background of patriotic
pictures of strutting soldiers and, a few hours later, a cross-looking man
in a uniform appeared on the screen and said that he had done it for the
good of his country. General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's new military
leader, certainly has all the trappings of an old-fashioned villain; and he
was welcomed as such by condemnations and expressions of concern from all over the world--including from that champion of democracy, China.
The instinct to support democrats and condemn military coups is correct, yet it is worth remembering that not all elected leaders are democrats and not all generals are villains. It is regrettable that the army should be the instrument of change in Pakistan, but the departure of the government of Nawaz Sharif (after Mr Sharif had tried to secure General Musharraf's departure) may well bring an improvement to the country's fortunes. Whether in fact it turns out that way depends entirely on what General Musharraf does now. He has the power to make his country a better place, or to destroy it.
Pakistan has been in such a mess for so long that it is tempting to conclude that the country is doomed. It was created in the chaos of partition, and torn since birth between conflicting cultures. It has a tribal social structure, an Islamic ideology and a legal and political system that is
British in origin. Islamic and secular law battle each other. Tribal
loyalties distort the democratic process. Shia and Sunni Muslims shoot each other on the streets. From the west, Afghanistan's Taliban spill into
Pakistan and bolster the growing ranks of its fundamentalists. On the other side of the country, the perpetual conflict with India over Kashmir helps destabilize domestic politics. In response to one mess or another, the generals have ousted politicians before, in 1958, in 1971 and in 1977.
Yet, whatever the pressures, individuals can still make a difference, and Mr Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, who have both had two turns in power, certainly have done. Their dismal performance has demeaned democracy and may have blown Pakistan's chances of maturing into a decently governed country for years to come. Mr Sharif is especially culpable.
He came to power in 1997 with a huge majority, and with the freedom that comes from strength. He could have used his power for good or ill.
He chose to use it badly, in two ways.
First, Mr Sharif fostered corruption. It is unclear how deeply implicated he
himself was: the former chief justice, Sajjad Ali Shah, had agreed to hear
corruption charges against Mr Sharif, but was sacked soon afterwards. In any event, as most Pakistanis would agree, their country stinks. Corruption undermines not just the polity, but the economy as well. One of Pakistan's big problems is ordinary people's refusal to pay their taxes. And one reason why ordinary people do not pay their taxes is that they reckon the politicians will steal their money.
Second, Mr Sharif used his considerable power to attack not just his
political opponents, but also the institutions essential to the proper
functioning of a democracy. When he got into an argument with the chief
justice in 1997, mobs from Mr Sharif's party surrounded the Supreme Court, and Mr Shah was sacked. When the press gave Mr Sharif trouble, he turned on it, freezing bank accounts, confiscating newsprint and even having an editor imprisoned without charge for a month.
His placemen were put in to run the police, turning the guardians of law and order into the guardians of Mr Sharif's interests. And the army--which had seen one chief of staff sacked after criticizing Mr Sharif's capricious use of power--believed that the same was about to happen to it. "Despite all my advice," General Musharraf told the nation in the small hours of October 13th, "they tried to interfere with the armed forces, the last remaining viable institution in which all of you take so much pride and look up to at all times for stability, unity and integrity of your beloved country."
DISCONTENT ALL ROUND
It was not just the army that had turned against Mr Sharif. So had the
voters. In a country that takes easily to the streets, there were no
demonstrations protesting against the army's action, and a few supporting it.
In itself, however, that is not very reassuring. Widespread rejoicing was
the initial reaction when General Zia booted out Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in
1977. When Zia started jailing people indiscriminately, and executed Bhutto, feelings changed. Pakistanis now need to know what their new general intends.
The good news is that, although the army itself is a conservative and
Islamic organization, General Musharraf is not a fundamentalist: he is, say
those who know him, a westernized liberal who is alarmed by the spread of extremist views in Pakistan. Nor is he reckoned to have political ambitions.He gave his first broadcast to the nation, explaining his coup, in English, the language of the elite: anybody who had been planning a political career would have spoken in Urdu, the national language.
Yet even unambitious westernized liberals can acquire a dangerous taste for power. If General Musharraf is to persuade his countrymen--and the rest of the world--that he has done the right thing, he must quickly take three steps.
First, he needs to reassure India that he plans no new aggression. The
Indian government--and the American one, which negotiated the peace between India and Pakistan in July--is concerned that Pakistan's withdrawal of troops from Kashmir was the principal bone of contention between the army and Mr Sharif. It has expressed "grave concern" and placed its army on high alert along the border. Unless General Musharraf makes it clear that he has no wish to renew the conflict, the subcontinent could move back to the brink of war. Nowadays that could mean nuclear war.
Second, General Musharraf needs to make it very clear, very soon, that he is moving Pakistan towards democracy. He needs to set up a caretaker government that would have two main jobs: to prepare for a new set of elections and to clear up corruption. Tackling corruption is the more difficult task, but it is essential. Honesty and democracy go hand in hand. If politicians are reasonably honest, people will support the institutions of democracy; and if democracy works reasonably well, it will help root out corruption.
Lastly, General Musharraf needs to go back to his barracks and keep quiet. If he has the sense to do that, he will go down in history as one of the few Pakistani leaders who has done his country a favor. If he tries to hold on to power, he will, in the long run, fail. In that event, he might well bring his country down with him.
nostalgic about the events in Pakistan on October 12th. Televisions went
black, then martial music started up against a background of patriotic
pictures of strutting soldiers and, a few hours later, a cross-looking man
in a uniform appeared on the screen and said that he had done it for the
good of his country. General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's new military
leader, certainly has all the trappings of an old-fashioned villain; and he
was welcomed as such by condemnations and expressions of concern from all over the world--including from that champion of democracy, China.
The instinct to support democrats and condemn military coups is correct, yet it is worth remembering that not all elected leaders are democrats and not all generals are villains. It is regrettable that the army should be the instrument of change in Pakistan, but the departure of the government of Nawaz Sharif (after Mr Sharif had tried to secure General Musharraf's departure) may well bring an improvement to the country's fortunes. Whether in fact it turns out that way depends entirely on what General Musharraf does now. He has the power to make his country a better place, or to destroy it.
Pakistan has been in such a mess for so long that it is tempting to conclude that the country is doomed. It was created in the chaos of partition, and torn since birth between conflicting cultures. It has a tribal social structure, an Islamic ideology and a legal and political system that is
British in origin. Islamic and secular law battle each other. Tribal
loyalties distort the democratic process. Shia and Sunni Muslims shoot each other on the streets. From the west, Afghanistan's Taliban spill into
Pakistan and bolster the growing ranks of its fundamentalists. On the other side of the country, the perpetual conflict with India over Kashmir helps destabilize domestic politics. In response to one mess or another, the generals have ousted politicians before, in 1958, in 1971 and in 1977.
Yet, whatever the pressures, individuals can still make a difference, and Mr Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, who have both had two turns in power, certainly have done. Their dismal performance has demeaned democracy and may have blown Pakistan's chances of maturing into a decently governed country for years to come. Mr Sharif is especially culpable.
He came to power in 1997 with a huge majority, and with the freedom that comes from strength. He could have used his power for good or ill.
He chose to use it badly, in two ways.
First, Mr Sharif fostered corruption. It is unclear how deeply implicated he
himself was: the former chief justice, Sajjad Ali Shah, had agreed to hear
corruption charges against Mr Sharif, but was sacked soon afterwards. In any event, as most Pakistanis would agree, their country stinks. Corruption undermines not just the polity, but the economy as well. One of Pakistan's big problems is ordinary people's refusal to pay their taxes. And one reason why ordinary people do not pay their taxes is that they reckon the politicians will steal their money.
Second, Mr Sharif used his considerable power to attack not just his
political opponents, but also the institutions essential to the proper
functioning of a democracy. When he got into an argument with the chief
justice in 1997, mobs from Mr Sharif's party surrounded the Supreme Court, and Mr Shah was sacked. When the press gave Mr Sharif trouble, he turned on it, freezing bank accounts, confiscating newsprint and even having an editor imprisoned without charge for a month.
His placemen were put in to run the police, turning the guardians of law and order into the guardians of Mr Sharif's interests. And the army--which had seen one chief of staff sacked after criticizing Mr Sharif's capricious use of power--believed that the same was about to happen to it. "Despite all my advice," General Musharraf told the nation in the small hours of October 13th, "they tried to interfere with the armed forces, the last remaining viable institution in which all of you take so much pride and look up to at all times for stability, unity and integrity of your beloved country."
DISCONTENT ALL ROUND
It was not just the army that had turned against Mr Sharif. So had the
voters. In a country that takes easily to the streets, there were no
demonstrations protesting against the army's action, and a few supporting it.
In itself, however, that is not very reassuring. Widespread rejoicing was
the initial reaction when General Zia booted out Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in
1977. When Zia started jailing people indiscriminately, and executed Bhutto, feelings changed. Pakistanis now need to know what their new general intends.
The good news is that, although the army itself is a conservative and
Islamic organization, General Musharraf is not a fundamentalist: he is, say
those who know him, a westernized liberal who is alarmed by the spread of extremist views in Pakistan. Nor is he reckoned to have political ambitions.He gave his first broadcast to the nation, explaining his coup, in English, the language of the elite: anybody who had been planning a political career would have spoken in Urdu, the national language.
Yet even unambitious westernized liberals can acquire a dangerous taste for power. If General Musharraf is to persuade his countrymen--and the rest of the world--that he has done the right thing, he must quickly take three steps.
First, he needs to reassure India that he plans no new aggression. The
Indian government--and the American one, which negotiated the peace between India and Pakistan in July--is concerned that Pakistan's withdrawal of troops from Kashmir was the principal bone of contention between the army and Mr Sharif. It has expressed "grave concern" and placed its army on high alert along the border. Unless General Musharraf makes it clear that he has no wish to renew the conflict, the subcontinent could move back to the brink of war. Nowadays that could mean nuclear war.
Second, General Musharraf needs to make it very clear, very soon, that he is moving Pakistan towards democracy. He needs to set up a caretaker government that would have two main jobs: to prepare for a new set of elections and to clear up corruption. Tackling corruption is the more difficult task, but it is essential. Honesty and democracy go hand in hand. If politicians are reasonably honest, people will support the institutions of democracy; and if democracy works reasonably well, it will help root out corruption.
Lastly, General Musharraf needs to go back to his barracks and keep quiet. If he has the sense to do that, he will go down in history as one of the few Pakistani leaders who has done his country a favor. If he tries to hold on to power, he will, in the long run, fail. In that event, he might well bring his country down with him.